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Background: This contribution seeks to measure preferences for health insurance in Germany and the Netherlands,
using two Discrete Choice Experiments (DCE). Since the Dutch DCE was carried out right after the 2006 health
reform, which made citizens explicitly choose a health insurance contract, two research questions naturally arise.
First, are the preferences with regard to contract attributes (such as Managed Care-type restrictions of physician
choice), incentives (such as bonus options for no claims, deductibles, and a bonus for preventive behavior), and
extra services provided by the health insurer (such as patient counseling) similar between the two countries? Second,
was the requirement to explicitly choose imposed by the Dutch government in the context of the reform effective in
reducing status quo bias with respect to future reforms?
Results: Based on random-effects Probit estimates, these two questions can be answered as follows. First, there is
resistance against Managed Care-type attributes in both populations, but Germans would have to be compensated
more for giving up free physician choice. Second, their status quo bias is twice as important as among their Dutch
counterparts, who apparently learned to bear the cost of information associated with future choices concerning their
health insurance.
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Governments in industrial countries have been trying to
respond to the rising cost of health care by modifying
health insurance (copayments, bonus options for new
claims) or changing the provision of health care (Managed
Care). However, it is far from clear whether citizens are
ready to accept these changes. If they conceive e.g.
Managed Care as constraining their choice of physician,
compensation must be offered to gain their acceptance. In
insurance-based systems, observed past choices provide
little guidance because they are distorted by regulated
contributions to health insurance, while in National
Health Service-type systems, medical care has a tax price
that is the same at a given income level.
In this situation, experimental evidence concerning
citizens’ preferences may be of value to avoid costly
mistakes by health insurers and policy makers. The* Correspondence: pzweifel@econ.uzh.ch
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reproduction in any medium, provided the origpresent contribution purports to report on so-called
market experiments of the Discrete Choice (DCE) type
in two insurance-based countries, Germany and the
Netherlands. This international comparison is of particular
interest for at least two reasons. First, while the two popula-
tions are not too dissimilar culturally, German health policy
has been characterized by new laws and regulations that
have increased uncertainty on the part of patients (Böcken
et al. [1]). By way of contrast, in the Netherlands a major
pro-competitive reform was enacted in 2006, accompanied
by a major information campaign designed to help citizens
choose a health insurance contract. Second, the Dutch
changes amount to something like a crossover between the
two countries. The status quo in the Netherlands is gate-
keeping by physicians (a variant of Managed Care), whereas
consumers possibly prefer free choice of physician. In
Germany, free choice of physician constitutes the status
quo, but policy makers consider introducing Managed Care
into social health insurance. Also, the Dutch insured were
familiar with a bonus for no claims reminiscent of auto
liability insurance, yet there were signs that they wanted toringer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
mmons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
inal work is properly credited.
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copayment (Ministerie van Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en
Sport [2]). In Germany, bonus options have been discussed
as a reform feature. Against this backdrop, this paper seeks
to answer two questions:
Q1: Are preferences of German and Dutch consumers
similar or dissimilar with regard to attributes of health
insurance?
Q2: Did the requirement to explicitly choose a health
insurance policy imposed by the Dutch government in the
context of the 2006 reform cause consumers to have less
status quo bias with regard to future reforms of health
insurance?
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted
to a sketch of the theory underlying DCEs. Section 3
describes the DCE and its results for Germany, while
Section 4 does the same for the Netherlands. Section 5
contains a comparison of the two countries, while
Section 6 offers concluding remarks.
Methods
Theory underlying discrete choice experiments
Respondents participating in a Discrete Choice Experiment
(DCE) are supposed to maximize (expected) utility. How-
ever, experimenters will never know all the determinants of
individual utility, which therefore give rise to a degree of
randomness in observed choices (Thurstone [3]). Therefore,
the relevant theoretical basis is the random utility model de-
veloped by McFadden [4,5] and Manski [6]. Let Vij denote
the level of utility optimally reached by individual i in situ-
ation j. Alternative j is associated with price pj, a vector of at-
tributes bj of the alternative, and income yi of the individual
and his or her socioeconomic characteristics si. Finally,
choices are also influenced by stochastic term εij that varies
between individuals and alternatives. Therefore, indirect
utility is given by
V ij ¼ v pj; bj; yi; si; εij
 
: ð1Þ
The standard assumption is that this utility can be
split into a deterministic and a stochastic part, with w(·)
containing the deterministic component,
v pj; bj; yi; ci; εij
 
¼ w pj; bj; yi; si
 
þ εij: ð2Þ
Since for the experimenter decisions contain a stochas-
tic element, all that can be analyzed is the probability Pij
of individual i choosing alternative j rather than alternative
l. With alternative j by assumption yielding at least as
much utility as any other alternative l, one has
Pij ¼ Pr w pj; bj; yi; si
 
þ εij≥w pl; bl; yi; sið Þ þ εil; ∀l≠j
h i
: ð3Þ
Rearranging yieldsPij ¼ Pr εil−εij≤w pj; bj; yi; si
 
−w pl; bl; yi; sið Þ; ∀l≠j
h i
: ð4Þ
The probability of choosing alternative j rather than l
therefore amounts to the probability that the stochastic
difference (εil – εij) is dominated by the systematic differ-
ence in utilities (wij – wj). This condition however can
only be related to observable choices if (εil – εij) follows
a distribution law. The major alternatives are the logistic
and the normal. Since the normal distribution is subject
to less restrictive assumptions (Train [7], ch. 7; Greene
[8] ch. 19; Ben-Akiva and Lerman [9], ch. 3), this is the
preferred choice (Probit model).
In the course of the experiment, every participant
makes several choices. Therefore, observations are of the
panel type, a fact that is reflected in the specification of
the error term. Writing the difference between the two
error terms as ϑij = εil − εij, the so-called random effects
specification reads (Johnson and Desvousges [10]),
ϑij ¼ υi þ ηij: ð5Þ
In this equation, υi denotes the individual-specific
component, which remains the same in the course of
the experiment. By way of contrast, ηij can vary between
individuals i and scenarios j.
The deterministic part w(·) of the utility function usually
is assumed to be linear and hence additively separable
(Johnson and Desvousges [10]; Ryan and Gerard [11]),





γkbjk þ γppj þ γyyi þ γssi; ð6Þ
with (γK, γpγyγs) denoting the parameters belonging to
the arguments of the utility function. In particular, γk
denotes the marginal utility of product attribute k.
Note the restrictiveness of this formulation, stating the
all respondents have the same additively separable func-
tion w(·). Since the contribution paid for health insurance
constitutes an attribute as well, is also true that the mar-
ginal loss of utility due to an increased contribution must
be the same for all individuals, independently of their in-
come. Such an assumption is deemed unrealistic because
usually marginal utility of income is assumed to decrease
in income. However, socioeconomic differences in mar-
ginal utility of attributes can be made part of the specifica-
tion. All it takes is complementing the function above
with interaction terms of the type γk ⋅ (bkyi). Partial differ-
entiation of w(·) w.r.t. then bk results in δk + γk ⋅ yi. For
example, if γk > 0 and δk < 0, marginal utility of attribute
k decreases as a function of income.
Marginal rate of substitution and willingness-to-pay
In the course of the experiment, participants need to
tradeoff between the different attributes of a scenario.
Their preference structure is reflected by the marginal
Leukert-Becker and Zweifel Health Economics Review 2014, 4:22 Page 3 of 11
http://www.healtheconomicsreview.com/content/4/1/22rate of substitution (MRS) between two attributes k and
m, given by the ratio of the two respective marginal
utilities,
MRSk;m ¼ − ∂v=∂bk∂v=∂bm : ð7Þ
This trade-off and its experimental measurement are
illustrated by Figure 1.
The point of departure is the status quo, symbolized
by point A, with much (k’) of attribute k and little (m’)
of attribute m. Now the respondent is faced with alter-
native B, with only k” < k’ of attribute k, but m” >m’ of
attribute m in return. If the respondent prefers the status
quo, it must have higher utility than the alternative. This
means that B lies below the indifference curve through
A, causing the respondent to stay with the status quo.
However, another alternative given by point C would be
preferred to the status quo. Clearly, through repeated
choices, the indifference curve can be interpolated, with
Δm/Δk denoting the MRS between the two attributes.
Now redefine attribute m as the net income after
having paid the price for the good (here, the premium
for the health insurance contract). By partially differ-
entiating the indirect utility function with regard to
the price attribute, one therefore obtains the (negative
of ) the marginal utility of income. The MRS then indi-
cates how much income an individual is prepared to
sacrifice in order to obtain more of attribute k. This
amounts to the marginal willingness-to-pay for attribute
k, measured in money (Louviere et al. [12] ch. 3).
Results
The discrete choice experiment in Germany
The choice of relevant attributes describing a health in-
surance contract is far from clear. However, in Germany













Figure 1 Marginal rate of substitution between two attributes.attributes, which also turned out to be ‘important’ in a
qualitative pretest.
 Amount of physician choice. Here, the status quo
is free physician choice (see Table 1). One alternative
is a physician list established by the health insurer,
based on cost and quality criteria. A second
alternative is gatekeeping, meaning that a primary
care physician must be contacted first in the event
of illness. It is only then that the patient can choose
a specialist. The third, most restrictive alternative is
gatekeeping combined with a list of specialists
participating in a network. Again, first the
gatekeeping physician must be contacted; in addition
however, referrals can only be made to other
network physicians (who must take part in quality
assurance meetings and continued education).
 Second opinion. Here, the status quo requires
patients to come up with 10 Euro per quarter for
every additional physician they contact unless
referred by the treating physician. In the alternative,
one second opinion per quarter can be had free of
charge.
 Additional services or information provided by
health insurers. The status quo is no particular
services or information provided. However, when
insurers are to offer contracts with new ways of
providing care, consumers’ demand for information
quite likely increases. Therefore, the alternative
scenario provides for a qualified person available on
the telephone 24 hours per day for helping to
organize medical care and to inform about the
seriousness of symptoms.
 Incentives. Since the insured do not have to fully
bear the financial consequences of an illness, they
might be tempted to skim on preventive effort or
opt for the more costly therapy (Zweifel et al. [13],
ch. 6). The status quo is characterized by the
absence of any measures designed to counteract
these moral hazard effects. A first alternative is a
bonus option for no claims. If no health care
services (except recommended preventive and
screening services) are utilized during a year, there isTable 1 Status quo quo card (German DCE)
Your current policy
1. Amount of physician choice Unrestricted
2. Second opinion 10 Euro fee without a referral
3. Additional services provided by
insurer
No special services or information
provided
4. Incentives No special incentives
5. Health insurance contribution Your current annual contribution in
Euro ___
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alternative is a yearly deductible of 500 Euro, again
with the exceptions just mentioned. Third, an
insured who proves to have performed preventive
activities recommended by the insurer would obtain
a bonus such as reimbursement of fees or a free
week-end at a spa.
 Increase or decrease of the annual health
insurance contribution. Participants were asked to
check their pay schedule in order to calculate their
personal share of the total contribution in Euro. The
alternatives were increases and decreases of 200,
300, 400, and 500 Euro annually. The higher
amounts seem unrealistic; however, they need to be
set in a way that respondents sometimes move away
from the status quo, generating information about
their preferences.
The five stated attributes above and their levels can be
combined to form scenarios that can be compared to
the status quo. There is a total of 512 (=42 · 22 · 8), too
many for an experiment. The number of scenarios was
reduced using a so-called optimal design using GOSSET
(Carlsson and Martinsson [14]). The resulting 24 scenarios
were split up in random order into three sets with eight
decisions each. Table 2 contains an example of a decision
card. The DCE was fielded in September 2005, involving
around 1,000 individuals of age 25 and older, all members
of statutory health insurance. The experiment was con-
ducted on the basis of a written questionnaire. The sample
was drawn from a household panel of 70,000 German
households of a marketing agency that also conducted the
Dutch survey. The German sample is quite representative
of the resident population with respect to age, gender, oc-
cupation, and income. However, since respondents repeat-
edly participate in surveys, there may still be selection
effects which are impossible to control for (for more de-
tails, see Becker, Brändle and Zweifel [15]). Subscribers to
private health insurance were excluded because different
product attributes would have been relevant to them.Table 2 Example of a decision card (German DCE)
Alternative 1
1. Amount of physician choice Physician list
2. Second opinion 10 Euro fee without referral




4. Incentives Bonus for preventive
behavior
5. Increase/decrease of health insurance
contribution
Reduction by 500 Euro
annually
I opt for this alternative □
I opt for my current policy □Choices were analyzed using the Probit model, with the
random effects specification as described in equation (5),
using STATA (as well as LIMDEP for a consistency check).
The only explanatory variables are the (changes in) attri-
butes, making up the so-called core model (see Table 3).
The typical MC attributes (physician list, gatekeeping,
physician network) are hypothesized to be associated with
losses of utility on the part of consumers (see the negative
entries in the column, ‘Expected sign’). Indeed, all three
coefficients are significantly negative. Conversely, a second
opinion provided free of charge and additional services
provided by the health insurer are valued positively, as
predicted. The next two attributes, bonus for no claim
and deductible, are of particular interest. One could argue
that a bonus for no claims amounting to 500 Euro exposes
the insured to the same risk as a fixed deductible of 500
Euro because they will end up paying the first 500 Euro
out of pocket in both cases. However, this argument over-
looks the fact that a bonus option permits consumers to
separate two losses in time that occur simultaneously
under the deductible, viz. the health loss and the financial
loss caused by the cost of medical care. With a deductible,
these two losses are perfectly correlated during a quarter
(say). With a bonus option, they are separated in time be-
cause consumers can sacrifice their bonus to obtain full
coverage, shifting the financial loss to later periods in the
guise of a higher premium (Zweifel and Waser [16], ch. 3).
Indeed, Table 3 shows that respondents valued the bonus
option favorably, while resisting a deductible of the same
amount. However, they are also interested in a bonus for
preventive behavior. The price attribute has a negative co-
efficient as predicted and is of very high statistical signifi-
cance. Finally, the constant is worth commenting. If the
core model were completely specified, it should be zero
because the (changes in) attributes included account fully
for the difference in utility between the status quo and the
respective alternative – a rather unlikely event. The nega-
tive value of the constant points to status quo bias, reflect-
ing neglected determinants of utility that cause the
alternative to be valued less highly ceteris paribus. Indeed,
20 percent out of the 1,000 participants never moved away
from the status quo, while four percent never made a de-
cision between the status quo and the alternative.
Note also that the estimated marginal effects are intui-
tive. For example, a physician list lowers the probability of
changing in favor of the alternative by an estimated 14 per-
centage points. Having to first visit a gatekeeping physician
of one’s choice is a far less stringent restriction. It is associ-
ated with a probability reduction of 5.3 percentage points
only. Having to sign up with a physician network compris-
ing also specialists has a lock-in effect, causing the prob-
ability of choosing the pertinent alternative to drop by an
estimated 8.9 percentage points. Compared to these attri-
butes, a second opinion free of charge and extra services
Table 3 Estimation results for the core model (attributes only), Germany
Attribute Expected sign Coefficient Std. error z-value Marg. eff.
Physician list - −0.69588 *** 0.06229 −11.17 −0.14019
Gatekeeping - −0.23197 *** 0.05848 −3.97 −0.05284
Network - −0.40916 *** 0.05944 −6.88 −0.08896
Second opinion + 0.16004 *** 0.04551 3.52 0.03869
Extra services + 0.24688 *** 0.04378 5.64 0.05968
Bonus no claims + 0.72262 *** 0.06023 12.00 0.19911
Deductible - −0.49546 *** 0.06607 −7.50 −0.10754
Bonus prev. beh. + 0.40934 *** 0.07948 5.15 0.11204
Contribution - −0.00201 *** 0.00007 −30.62 −0.00049
Constant 0 −1.00709 *** 0.07445 −13.53
συ = 0.9472 ρ = 0.4729.
Log likelihood: −3.074.
χ2 (0) = 742.57, Prob > χ2 = 0.0000.
n = 7,155.
***Coefficient different from zero with error probability < 1 percent.
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percentage points, respectively), as one would expect. The
one astonishing result is that the bonus for preventive
behavior apparently is as important (in absolute value) as
a deductible of 500 Euro.
Using equation (7), marginal willingness-to-pay (WTP)
values can be calculated from the coefficients displayed
in Table 3. The three attributes typical of MC options
have all to be compensated (see Table 4). Maximum
compensation is required for accepting a physician list,
amounting to 346 Euro per year, followed by participa-
tion in a physician network (203 Euro), and acceptance
of gatekeeping (115 Euro). Obtaining a second opinion
free of charge is valued at 80 Euro and extra services
provided by the health insurer, at 123 Euro per year.
As was to be expected, a bonus for no claims triggers
a positive WTP value, whereas a deductible amount-
ing to the same value of 500 Euro would have to beTable 4 Marginal willingness-to-pay values for attributes
(Germany), Euro/year
Attribute WTP Significance Std. error
Physician list −346 *** 31.04
Gatekeeping −115 *** 29.28
Network −203 *** 29.80
Second opinion 80 *** 22.33
Extra services 123 *** 22.32
Bonus no claims 359 *** 30.04
Deductible −246 *** 33.51
Bonus f. prev. beh. 203 *** 37.87
Contribution −500 *** 36.49
***WTP different from zero with an error probability of < 1 percent. Standard
errors calculated using the delta method.compensated. The difference between the two values is strik-
ing, amounting to no less than 605 Euro (=349 – (−246)).
Finally, the bonus for preventive effort is valued at 203
Euro annually.
Conclusion 1: In the German DCE, there is clear evi-
dence suggesting that respondents value health insurance
attributes in the way one would expect from economic
considerations.
In the following, status quo bias will be analyzed in
greater detail because of its importance for policy. From
Table 4, one can conclude that Germans are unwilling to
move away from the status quo unless they are compen-
sated by 500 Euro on average. However, this amount
varies with socioeconomic characteristics.
The entries of Table 5 are derived from a comprehensive
model that includes interaction terms in the Probit equa-
tion as described below equation (6). Using equation (7),
one can calculate WTP estimates, with all other character-
istics set at their median sample values.
While there is no recognizable gender difference, status
quo bias does significantly increase with age. Retired per-
sons exhibit maximum status quo bias, amounting to 953
Euro. Residents of Eastern (communist up to 1989) and
Western Germany and of cities of different size appear to
be homogeneous. Somewhat unexpectedly, education does
not seem to have a significant influence, although there is
some indication of less status quo bias among the highly
educated (who presumably can more easily acquire the in-
formation needed to compare an alternative to the status
quo). As could be expected however, respondents who
subjectively feel in bad health require particularly high
compensation for moving away from the status quo, as is
true of chronic patients. This is interesting because so-
called demand management programs focus on chronic-
ally ill persons, who are alleged to value them because of
Table 5 Group-specific status quo bias (WTP values),
Germany
WTP values for changing contract
Value (in Euro) Std. error
Women −508*** 50.05
Men −483*** 53.33
Prob > chi2/(chi2)a) 0.7392/(0.11)
Age < 43b) −329*** 50.13
Age 43 – 59b) −407*** 58.98
Age > 59b) −940*** 106.87
Prob > chi2/(chi2)a) 0.0000/(27.70)
Retired −953*** 118.96
Non-retired −402*** 38.11
Prob > chi2/(chi2)a) 0.0000/(19.45)
East −520*** 83.85
West −494*** 40.46
Prob > chi2/(chi2)a) 0.7841/(0.08)
City with > 50,000 inh. −569*** 69.67
City with < 50,000 inh. −473*** 42.82
Prob > chi2/(chi2)a) 0.2397/(1.38)
Education lowc) −590*** 92.07
Education mediumc) −520*** 43.86
Education highc) −411*** 74.72
Prob > chi2/(chi2)a) 0.4642/(1.54)
Healthy (subjective) −297*** 54.05
Ill (subjective) −609*** 48.98
Prob > chi2/(chi2)a) 0.0000/(18.95)
Non-chronic −446*** 39.72
Chronic −641*** 87.07
Prob > chi2/(chi2)a) 0.0416/(4.15)
No physician visitd) −402*** 68.55
Physician visitd) −533*** 42.90
Prob > chi2/(chi2)a) 0.1221/(2.39)
a)Group-specific values differ with an error probability = Prob > chi2 (chi2-value
after slash, bold and in italics if difference is significant at 5 percent or better).
b)Each of the three age groups contains about 33 percent of observations.
c)Individuals with 9, 12, and 18 years of education, respectively.
d)At least one physician visit related to illness during the past 12 months.
*** (**, *) WTP values (compensations asked) different from zero with error
probability of > 1 (>5, > 10) percent.
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borne out; to the contrary, chronically ill respondents ex-
hibit an especially marked preference for the status quo (for
more detail, see MacNeil Vroomen and Zweifel [17]). This
is also true of persons who had at least one illness-related
physician visit during the past twelve months.
Conclusion 2: The German DCE points to marked
status quo bias, whose magnitude differs between socio-
economic groups, however.The discrete choice experiment in the Netherlands
A second DCE was performed in the Netherlands in
May 2006. By March 2006, every citizen had to have
explicitly chosen a health insurance contract. Therefore,
respondents had been made to bear the cost of decision
associated with the choice of a health insurance policy.
While most of the attributes were the same as in the
German DCE, three adjustments were necessary. First,
pretests suggested a second opinion free of charge to be
far less important than expeditious (defined to be within
four weeks in the DCE) access to hospital care. In fact,
waiting for hospital treatment was a hotly debated issue
in the Netherlands at the time. Second, the status quo
for physician choice and incentives had to be defined
differently. Already before the reform of 2006, physician
choice was constrained in that patients had to contact a
gatekeeping physician first. Therefore, one of the alter-
natives became free physician choice. Third, there was
already a bonus for no claims under the status quo,
attaining a maximum of 255 Euro annually. The survey
was conducted by the same marketing agency as in
Germany, using a written questionnaire. The 763 re-
spondents of a panel of Dutch households closely matched
the resident population [see Becker, Brändle and Zweifel
[15] for more details]. Here again, 20 percent never moved
away from the status quo; however, only 0.7 percent never
made a decision (compared to 4 percent in Germany).
Probit estimates are displayed in Table 6. The three vari-
ables relating to physician choice are highly significant
and have the predicted sign (recall that the status quo in
the Netherlands is gatekeeping). Guaranteed access to
hospital care within four weeks is positively valued as pre-
dicted, as are additional services provided by the health
insurer. However, the transition from the existing bonus
option for no claims to an alternative without such an op-
tion (or one worth 500 Euro, respectively) is not relevant.
What is strongly resisted is a deductible amounting again
to 500 Euro annually. A bonus for preventive behavior is
valued positively and an increase in the annual contribu-
tion, negatively (as expected).
The estimated marginal effects are reasonable. Free
choice of physician is associated with a 5.9 percentage
point increase in the probability of choosing the alterna-
tive. The transition from gatekeeping to a physician list
established by the health insurer serves to decrease this
probability by 8.7 percentage points. Thus, a change from
free physician choice to such a physician list can be esti-
mated to lower choice probability by 14.7 (=5.9 + 8.7) per-
centage points. A change to a physician network would
have a somewhat smaller effect, amounting to a reduction
in probability by 11.0 (=5.1 + 5.9) percentage points. Ac-
cess to the hospital within four weeks is associated with
an increase of 4.9 percentage points in choice probability,
followed by additional services provided by insurers (3.9
Table 6 Estimation results for the core model (contract attributes only), Netherlands
Expected sign Coefficient Std. error z-value Marginal effect
Free choice of physiciana) + 0.22756 *** 0.06156 3.70 0.05862
Physician lista) - −0.39694 *** 0.06703 −5.92 −0.08745
Networka) - −0.22051 *** 0.06446 −3.42 −0.05086
Hospital access + 0.20267 *** 0.05012 4.04 0.04943
Service insurer + 0.16260 *** 0.04796 3.39 0.03966
No bonus option - 0.02117 0.05857 0.36 0.00519
Deductible - −1.18245 *** 0.07178 −16.47 −0.22555
Bonus prev. behav. + 0.00038 0.08081 0.00 0.00009
Contribution - −0.00289 *** 0.00010 −27.53 −0.00071
Constant 0 −0.74269 *** 0.07523 −9.87
συ = 0,8258 ρ = 0,4055.
Log likelihood: −2.541,09.
χ2 (0) = 11.179,10, Prob > χ2 = 0,0000.
n = 5,976.
a)Status quo is gatekeeping.
***Coefficient different from zero with error probability < 1 percent.
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claims from 255 to 500 Euro does not seem to affect
choice probability. However, the most striking result is
that an annual deductible amounting to 500 Euro would
cause the likelihood of accepting the alternative to drop
by no less than 23 percentage points.
Again, WTP values (shown in Table 7, left-hand side)
can be derived from Probit coefficients. Concentrating
on the Dutch values, one notes first that changing from
gatekeeping to free choice of physician would trigger a
WTP value of 79 Euro, while the change to a physician
list would require compensation to the tune of 137 Euro
per year. Assuming local constancy of the MRS, one can
therefore infer that the transition from free physician
choice to a physician list would require a compensation
of 216 Euro (=79 + 137) annually, compared to 155 Euro
(=79 + 76) for the transition to a physician network.Table 7 Marginal willingness-to-pay values for attributes (der
Germany
Δa) WTP Netherlands




Services insurer Δ 56***
Bonus option Δ −7
Deductible Δ −409***
Bonus prev. beh. Δ 0
Constant Δ −256***
Values in Euro per year.
a)Difference between Germany and the Netherlands significant at the 5 percent lev
b)Transferred from Table 6. For comparison purposes, the figures for the Netherland
c)WTP for increasing the bonus for no claims from 255 to 500 Euro in the Netherlan
***WTP different from zero with an error probability of < 1 percent.These estimates make intuitive sense because a physician
list constitutes the harshest restriction, followed by a
physician network (with its potential lock-in effect) and
followed by gatekeeping (the status quo in the Netherlands).
Guaranteed hospital access within four weeks is valued
somewhat less, presumably because respondents take the
comparatively low likelihood of hospitalization into account.
Additional services provided by the health insurer is at the
low end with 56 Euro per year, while increasing the bonus
option to 500 Euro (or to zero, respectively) and the bonus
for preventive behavior have no significant WTP value.
By way of contrast, a 500 Euro deductible would have to
be compensated by no less than 409 Euro to be accepted.
This points to an extreme degree of risk aversion, since a
full 42 percent of Dutch respondents stated that they had
no illness-related physician visit during the previous year.
Conservatively assuming that healthcare expenditure canived from the core model), Netherlands compared to











s take free choice of physician as the benchmark.
ds.
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290 Euro (=0.42 · 0 + 0.58 · 500), with variance Var(W) =
60,900. Applying the Arrow-Pratt formula (Arrow [18]),
WTPs ¼ 12RA⋅Var Wð Þ; ð8Þ
with WTPs denoting WTP for safety. Since it amounts
to 119 Euro (=409 – 290), one obtains a coefficient of
absolute risk aversion RA = 0.0039. With average wealth
among respondents set at W = 10,000 Euro (the concen-
tration of financial wealth is high among the Dutch,
with the top 1 percent having a 25 percent share, see
Gowling [19]), the coefficient of relative risk aversion
RR amounts toa
RR ¼ W ⋅RA≅39: ð9Þ
This is an extremely high value in international com-
parison (see e.g. Barsky et al. [20] for U.S. values, which
do not exceed 6). It can also be interpreted as the elasticity
of WTPs w.r.t. wealth, where aggregate values around 1.5
are common in industrial countries (Szpiro [21]).
Again, group-specific WTP values in the Dutch sample
are derived (see Table 8, left-hand side). There is no
evidence of a gender-specific difference, while status quo
bias clearly increases with age and retired status. Prior to
the 2006 reform, a distinction existed between privately
and legally insured (in a way similar to Germany, where
high-wage earners can opt out of the statutory scheme).
With the reform, this distinction was lifted. However,
there is no significant difference between the two groups
of insured. Community size does not matter either; how-
ever, there is evidence suggesting that highly educated
respondents have a more marked status quo bias than
others, which is true also of those who feel ill subject-
ively, the chronically ill, and those with an illness-related
physician visit during the past twelve months (for more
details, see MacNeil Vroomen and Zweifel [17]).
Conclusion 2: The Dutch DCE suggests that a change
in the bonus option for no claims and a bonus for pre-
ventive behavior are irrelevant to consumers. The other
estimated WTP values are significant and in accordance
with economic considerations.
Discussion
The evidence presented permits to address the two re-
search questions posed in the Background section. They
both involve a comparison between the two countries,
which can be performed using Tables 7 and 8. Table 7
shows the relative importance of product attributes in
the Netherlands compared to Germany. With regard to
the attributes, recall that WTP values for the Netherlands
are measured as deviations from a counterfactual status
quo ‘free choice of physician’. The following statementsare based on a joint dataset containing only overlapping
attributes. A dummy variable taking on the value 1 if the
observation relates to the Netherlands is interacted with
the explanatory variables of the core model. A ‘Δ’ indicates
that this dummy variable is statistically significant.
Thus, Dutch respondents would have to be compen-
sated less for accepting a physician list created by health
insurers than their German counterparts. It seems that
they are already used to insurers having influence on
physician choice. However, the transition to a physician
network would have to be compensated to the same
degree in the two countries. On the other hand, in the
Dutch sample extra services provided by the health in-
surer are valued less than in the German sample.
The most salient differences concern the assessment of
a bonus for no claims and of a deductible. The Dutch
sample exhibits an insignificant willingness to pay for a
change away from the status quo value of 255 Euro,
whereas in the German sample there is a substantial WTP
for increasing it to 500 Euro. With regard to the 500 Euro
deductible, the Dutch appear to be far more risk averse
than the Germans in that they would have to be compen-
sated by no less than 409 Euro, compared to 246 Euro in
the German sample [see equation (9) again]). One explan-
ation of this difference may that the Dutch are exposed to
an additional risk that does not concern the Germans.
This is the income risk associated with a sickness episode,
which is usually neglected by health economists, as em-
phasized in Zweifel and Manning [22]. Indeed, in response
to the ´Dutch disease´ of the early 1990s, the Dutch
government implemented reforms designed to reduce the
incidence of sick leave. The new Sickness Benefits Act of
1998 obliged employers to hire a private certified agency
to develop a rehabilitation program within 90 days of sick
leave. This was complemented by the Improved Gate-
keeper’s Act in 2002, which required employers to evi-
dence ‘sufficient’ effort during the first 52 weeks of a sick
leave spell before being able to apply for long-term bene-
fits (paid to them rather than their workers) (Bockting
[23]). By way of contrast, there is no monitoring of sick
leave pay in Germany; in addition, the full wage continues
to be paid by employers for the first six weeks, after which
time the sick funds take over. Up to 2006, this generous
scheme applied to blue-collar workers only; from then on,
it was extended to cover white collars as well. For the
Dutch, an increased bonus for no claims and especially a
deductible therefore amounts to an accumulation of two
risks, which they seek to avoid. In the terms of Eeckhoudt
and Schlesinger [24], the Dutch would face a higher ´pain
of risk bearing´ than the Germans.
Finally, a bonus for preventive behavior does not trig-
ger willingness to pay at all in the Dutch sample but is
valued with a remarkable 203 Euro per year in Germany.
Since the WTP values differ between the two samples
Table 8 Group-specific estimates of status quo bias, Netherlands compared to Germany
WTP values for changing contract
Netherlands Std. error Germanye) Std. error
Women −226*** 34.65 −508*** 50.05
Men −292*** 38.90 −483*** 53.33
Prob > chi2/(chi2)a) 0.2020/(1.63) 0.7392/(0.11)
Age < 41b),e) −162*** 35.56 −329*** 50.13
Age 41 – 55 −234*** 42.63 −407*** 58.98
Age > 55 −479*** 70.97 −940*** 106.87
Prob > chi2/(chi2)a) 0.0559/(5.81) 0.0090/(27.70)
Retired −456*** 85.83 −953*** 118.96
Non-retired −221*** 26.93 −402*** 38.11
Prob > chi2/(chi2)a) 0.0089/(6.84) 0.0000/(19.45)
Privately insurede) −293*** 46.15 n.a. n.a.
Legally insured −240*** 31.23 n.a. n.a.
Prob > chi2/(chi2)a) 0.3403/(0.91) 0.7841/(0.08)
City with > 50,000 inh.a) −241*** 34.87 −569*** 69.67
City with < 50,000 inh.a) −281*** 38.95 −473*** 42.82
Prob > chi2/(chi2)a) 0.4511/(0.57) 0.2397/(1.38)
Education lowc) −212*** 37.60 −590*** 92.07
Education mediumc) −261*** 50.87 −520*** 43.86
Education highc) −336*** 51.46 −411*** 74.72
Prob > chi2/(chi2)a) 0.1521/(3.77) 0,4642/(1.54)
Healthy (subjective) −164*** 33.99 −297*** 54.05
Ill (subjective) −325*** 38.33 −609*** 48.98
Prob > chi2/(chi2)a) 0.0017/(9.88) 0.0000/(18.95)
Non-chronic −225*** 28.67 −446*** 39.72
Chronic −351*** 58.44 −641*** 87.07
Prob > chi2/(chi2)a) 0.0542/(3.71) 0.0416/(4.15)
No physician visit −204** 37.36 −402*** 68.55
Physician visitd) −297*** 36.05 −533*** 42.90
Prob > chi2/(chi2)a) 0.0722/(3.23) 0.1221/(2.39)
a)Group-specific values differ with an error probability = Prob > chi2 (chi2-value after slash, bold and in italics if difference is significant at 5 percent or better).
b)Age groups are < 43, 43–59, and > 59 in the German sample to contain about 55 percent of observations.
c)Individuals with 9, 12, and 18 years of education, respectively.
d)At least one physician visit related to illness during the past 12 months.
*** (**, *) WTP values (compensations asked) with error probability of > 1 (>5, > 10) percent different from zero.
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one may draw
Conclusion 3: Question Q1 can be answered as
follows. Whereas most of comparable attributes of a
health insurance contract are valued the same qualita-
tively, almost all WTP values differ in magnitude,
pointing to differences in preference between the two
countries.
It should be borne in mind, however, that the differences
found can also be caused by differences in the status quo or
in excluded non-overlapping attributes [the utility function
may not be additively separable as assumed in equation (6)].The last row of Table 7 contains a preliminary answer
to the second question. In the Dutch sample, status quo
bias amounts to just about one-half of the German
value. However, the determinants of status quo have very
much the same effects in the two countries (see Table 8).
Higher age, retirement status, being subjectively ill, be-
ing chronically ill, and having an illness-related physician
visit during the previous twelve months all cause it to
be higher than among the remainder of the sample (no
significance tests are available for checking differences
in gradients). On the other hand, neither gender nor
community size matter in the two countries. There is
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Netherlands goes along with higher status quo bias,
whereas the tendency is almost the reverse in Germany.
In all, the evidence supports
Conclusion 4: The answer to question Q2 is that the
requirement to explicitly choose a health insurance policy
imposed by the Dutch government in the context of the
2006 reform may well have served to reduce status quo
bias with regard to future reforms, without however
eliminating group-specific differences.
As a final piece of evidence, the standard errors shown
in Table 8 can be compared. They are consistently lower
in the Dutch than in the German sample, although the
Dutch DCE involved only 760 rather than 1,000 respon-
dents. Given identical sample size, they should even be
13 percent lower [(760/1,000)½ = 0.87]. Apparently, the
2006 reform had caused citizens to bear the information
cost associated with deciding between health insurance
contracts by the time the DCE was fielded (May 2006).
Of course, there is still the alternate explanation that the
Dutch have more homogenous preferences with regard
to health insurance than the Germans.
Conclusions
This contribution is one of the few that seek to compare
preferences with regard to health insurance across na-
tional borders. The objective was to find out whether
the Dutch might value attributes of health insurance and
provision of health care differently than the Germans.
The comparison is based on two Discrete Choice Experi-
ments (DCEs) performed in Germany (with no effective
reform) and in the Netherlands right after the 2006 re-
form, which made citizens explicitly choose their health
insurance. One finding is that important contract attri-
butes are valued in the same qualitative way by the two
populations. Specifically, Managed Care-type features
such as a physician list established by the health insurer,
gatekeeping, and adherence to a physician network must
be compensated in both countries. Conversely, additional
services provided by the health insurer trigger positive
WTP whereas an annual deductible of 500 Euro would
have to be highly compensated to be accepted. However,
bonuses for proven preventive effort and no claims are re-
ceived favorably only in Germany, not in the Netherlands.
Differences also arise with regard to the magnitudes of
WTP values. Notably, a 500 Euro deductible has to be
compensated almost twice as much in the Netherlands
than in Germany, likely because of an income risk due to
illness confronting the Dutch. Therefore, one first has to
conclude that there is evidence of differences in the pref-
erence structure of the two populations. Second, however,
there is a striking difference in terms of status quo bias,
which requires only one-half as much compensation in
the Netherlands compared to Germany. Therefore, therequirement to specifically choose a health insurance pol-
icy imposed by the Dutch government in the context of
the 2006 reform may well have been effective in reducing
status quo bias, potentially facilitating future reforms of
health insurance.
Endnote
aThere is an alternative way of deriving the RA
estimate, by using an indifference relation involving a
Euro 500 deductible and the required compensation in
the same way as the Arrow-Pratt formula is derived
(Fred Schroyen, private correspondence). However,
while involving an additional Taylor approximation, it
leads to a very similar value (RA = 0.0049).
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